Introduction
The 2008 economic crisis redefined the political relationship between European citizens and the European Union, between the member states and EU institutions, and between countries within the European Union, unveiling economic, social and cultural differences across member states and within their domestic polities that had previously remained largely concealed. The crisis led to the re-emergence of critical nodes of the European project, questioning the very principles adhered to by member states and European citizens.
Like other scholars (Bolgherini 2016; Fabbrini 2015) , we interpret the period that followed the economic crisis as a critical juncture in the process of European integration -the third, according to Fabbrini, after the two that followed the end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War. European integration has been considered as "perpetually in crisis" (Baglioni and Hurrelmann 2016, 104) and, indeed, a permanent status of crisis and the management thereof are a constitutional feature of democratic regimes (Urbinati 2013) . However, the current phase stands out as something different from the ordinary strains and pressures that are part and parcel of democratic life. Rather than being the manifestation of the typical tensions and dynamics, the processes of European integration and EU decision-making have evidenced the need for major reform of the European Union's institutional architecture and modus operandi, and presented national and European leaders with choices that will have a lasting impact (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Pierson 2004) on the Union's nature and identity.
A commonly held (but not consensus 1 ) view is that what started as an exogenous financial crisis evolved into an economic and then sovereign debt crisis in the weakest EU member states. This, in turn, ended up engulfing the monetary union (Majone 2014b ), leading to a profound political crisis for the EU as a whole: a crisis of leadership, legitimacy and, ultimately, purpose. Whilst much has already been said 1 According to a group of leading European economists, the Euro crisis 'should not be thought of as a government crisis in its origin -even though it evolved into one'. See http://www.voxeu.org/article/ez-crisis-consensus-narrative. on the individual 'dimensions of crisis' outlined above, far less is known on how they interweave and on their long-term effects, notably their impact on the EU's institutional architecture, on the politicisation of the European public sphere, on the wider dynamics of representation that underpin these processes, and on the political systems and polities of the member states. With this special issue, and in this introduction, we aim to contribute to the understanding of these themes. We do so by offering, first, an interpretative overview of the key dimensions of crisis that are currently challenging the EU. Drawing on such premises, we move on to appraise the 2014 European Parliament election -understood as a turning point for the EU -with reference to the findings of the six articles in this collection. We then conclude with some reflections on what the trends discussed in the special issue tell us about the future 'visions of Europe' and the associated implications for research designs.
A crisis of leadership
The ways in which the initial economic crisis and the subsequent Eurozone crisis were tackled by the EU demonstrated an inability of EU leaders to act swiftly, cohesively and for the long term. Whilst there has been a European response -or rather a succession of European responses -they have been partial.
2 They were achieved "slowly and reluctantly" (Hall 2014 (Hall , 1231 and weighted disproportionately on Southern member states, on whom adjustment costs were largely concentrated (see Hall 2014) . Most of all, as recently argued by a group of prominent European economists under the Vox-EU platform, the response measures did not focus on the underlying roots of the crisis, without a consensus on which the necessary long-term solution is unlikely to emerge.
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Agreement on the causes and, as a result, on the solutions to the Eurozone crisis has proved impossible, in part, because of the different mindsets of EU leaders, embedded in distinct national economic doctrines and political economy histories (Hall 2014) and, in part, because of the divergent national interests and unpalatability 2 They have resulted in a composite and incremental mix of bailout packages, dedicated European funds (the European Financial Stability Fund and, subsequently, the European Stability Mechanism), enhanced monitoring of national economic policies (the European semester), and coordination of national fiscal policies (the Fiscal Compact) (Begg 2015b; Crum and Curtin 2015 (Begg 2015a) , demonstrating an awareness of the challenges in implementation. Despite this toning down -which led to criticism about the incisiveness of the package -many of the provisions proposed are still "likely to encounter resistance from a number of EU countries" (Begg 2015a States, restating the need to 'remain vigilant' and constantly monitor the nonrecognition policy and EU sanctions already in place (Wallström et al. 2016 ). More incisive, EU-wide political action was clearly seen as out of question.
A crisis of legitimacy
A second issue, which is closely connected with the leadership crisis outlined above, concerns legitimacy. The responses given to the economic and Euro crises highlighted a growing contradiction between, on the one hand, the 'emergency', largely technocratic, EU-level decision-making (White 2015; Statham and Trenz 2015) , and, on the other hand, the increased salience of the EU in the public debates within the member states. The crisis, and the associated EU response, contributed to the Europeanisation of public discourses in the EU member states, and in so doing they increased the saliency of the EU in domestic political debates, bringing renewed centrality to EU institutions and policies (Leupold 2016) . This has improved the ability of European citizens to apportion 'blame' for EU-level decisions to the EU rather than to national parliaments. However, it has not translated into an improved ability of EU citizens to precisely identify those actors (European-level parties and politicians as decision-makers) that should be punished (Hobolt and Tilley 2014) . Put simply, European citizens are unable to throw the (European) rascals out, insofar as it is difficult for them "to identify which parties are responsible for the current policy outcomes and which parties offer an alternative" (Hobolt 2014 (Hobolt , 1531 . Parliament's interpretation of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty) be appointed Commission President in the event of electoral victory (Hobolt 2014; Schmitt, Hobolt, and Popa 2015) . Thus, for the first time, voters had the opportunity to clearly identify the nominees running for the head of the European executive. The aim of this was twofold: to exploit the mobilisation effect of personalisation (Musella and Webb 2015; Calise 2015) in order to create a stronger connection with citizens, and to bridge the EU accountability gap (Gattermann, de Vreese, and van der Brug 2016) .
However, evidence available to date suggests that the impact of this change on voting behaviour has been limited, albeit diversified across member states (Hobolt 2015) . In sum, the way the EU has responded to the economic and Eurozone crises manifests a number of accountability and, as a result, legitimacy deficits, and "it is not only the citizens that are being excluded from the debate about the future of the Eurozone" (Majone 2014a (Majone , 1221 , but also national governments and parliaments.
Many national governments had to agree to severe austerity measures and structural reform programmes (concerning the welfare state and labour market) not as a result of domestic political choices but as the outcome of negotiations with external actors:
the 'Troika', the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other member states'
governments. The fact that a number of national governments, constrained by the pressures of international financial markets, had to redefine their policy agendas according to such external demands has been viewed as an interference which has undermined "democratic self-determination" and impacted on "citizens sense of selfefficacy", increasing their "dissatisfaction with democracy" (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014, 424) . In Greece, for example, in July 2015, when the bailout deal was being finalised about one week after the Greek referendum had rejected further austerity, "the hashtag #thisisacoup trended on twitter" (Buttonwood 2015) .
Scholarly debates have long focussed on whether the EU is characterised by a democratic deficit (Føllesdal and Hix 2006) . This debate has grown in parallel with the expansion of the EU's supranational competences via successive treaty reforms.
In this debate, legitimation has been characterised mainly by democratic input or substantive output (Hobolt 2015; Majone 2014a) ; at the present juncture, the EU appears to be failing on both fronts. As a result, in continuation with a trend whose 
A crisis of purpose
The leadership crisis within the EU outlined above goes hand in hand with a loss of shared purpose. The Euro, for example, which was originally conceived as a tool to foster an ever-closer political union, has become a goal in itself in the most recent narratives of European leaders (Majone 2014b ). On one level, this may not be surprising if, despite "the bold political vision set out in the founding treaty" of an ever-closer political union, monetary and market integration have been the actual core of "the reality of European integration" (Hobolt and de Vries 2016, 22.8) .
However, this shift in focus can be interpreted as a resignation from even the intention to pursue the treaty's ambitious political goals. Taken to extremes, it can be read as a sign that EU leaders are abdicating their very role.
More recently, the Brexit negotiations can be seen as a further example of a lack of common vision by EU leadership on what the EU should be about. Primarily engaged in finding workable solutions to accommodate UK requests, so as to avert the loss of an important member and the political and economic consequences that this would entail, EU leaders failed to engage in a thorough reflection about the systemic reforms that would be necessary in an increasingly contested -but also ever-expanding has not yet received a proper answer" (Meny 2014 (Meny , 1336 .
In many respects, it could be argued that rather than having stopped at a crossroad, European integration is taking steps backwards in the institutionalisation process that transformed the economic community into a political union in the making. Such retrenchment is showing the fragility of progress realised through an integration 'by stealth': a process that benefitted from a long, but not perpetual, favourable economic context, and that appears ill-suited to a much-enlarged EU, where growing diversity is making the costs of EU integration increasingly visible (Majone 2014a) . In truth, the process of integration is becoming increasingly differentiated too (Tekin 2012) , but this is actually exacerbating the territorial cleavages between member states. For example, the divides between creditor and debtor countries, and between members and non-members of the Eurozone, are becoming starker (Majone 2014a) . And this is happening at a time when the internal divides within the member states are also deepening, as shown by the momentum gained by independentist parties. The presence of secessionist and independentist parties is spreading across many EU member states (Elias and Tronconi 2011; Hepburn and Elias 2011; Hepburn 2009 ), signalling the emergence of internal fractures that further problematise the process of integration (Laible 2008 ). Against such a complex backdrop, the future political direction of the EU appears increasingly uncertain, and the risk that the EU will turn into a 'club of clubs' (Majone 2014a; Majone 2014b) seems tangible.
Visions of Europe: key issues and the challenges ahead
The analysis developed in the previous sections illustrates how, in the current context, the EU project is facing multiple institutional, political and democratic challenges. As noted above, the lack of a cohesive and effective EU political leadership, the declining trust in the EU and the on-going alteration of political and party dynamics within the member states are placing Europe and its institutions under considerable strain. The aim of this collection of articles emerges from the need to shed light on the roots, manifestations and implications of such pressures. To achieve this, we take the 2014 European Parliament elections as a starting point for analysis.
Such an approach rests on the view that the 2014 European Parliament electoral round epitomises, in a most profound way, the idiosyncrasies implicit in the EU project. Taking place at a time when the effects of the economic crisis and the consequent dissatisfaction with austerity measures were still sharply felt by EU citizens, the 2014 elections were an important test for the European Union and for the institution of democracy within and across EU member states. In many respects, although European Parliament elections are often described as 'second order', this time around the vote for the European Parliament seemed to challenge such a view.
In spite of, or perhaps due to, the multiple crises described above, which are undermining the very foundations of the European Union as a political project, the EU is playing an increasingly central role in the public debate and has been thrust centre stage. Albeit framed mainly in a negative sense (i.e. with more reference to flaws than to virtues), the 2014 European Parliament elections coincided with an increased politicisation of the EU and with a profound alteration of the dynamics of representation underpinning the European sphere, which in turn affected domestic political and party systems. The articles in this collection provide fresh insights on these issues, as is discussed in the following sections.
The politicisation of the EU and the Europeanisation of public debates
The paradigm of second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980) , which has until recently acted as an effective interpretive key to understand voting behaviour in The results of this work suggest that the focus on the EU was mainly domestically oriented, that is, centred on national political actors and issues. Nonetheless, the research also reveals that the focus of public debate was on the EU, mostly driven by Eurosceptic stances, parties and leaders. The EU, in other words, was certainly more central in domestic public debates, but it was generally framed in a negative sense.
Dynamics of representation
Dynamics of political representation are rapidly changing within and across the EU, putting the increasingly problematic nature of the relationship between EU citizens and institutions under the spotlight. The structural weaknesses that inhibit the ability of EU institutions to respond to external challenges, such as the economic and humanitarian crises, have already been discussed in the preceding sections. The key point here is that such processes have considerably undermined the legitimacy of the EU. Hence, it is important to investigate further the motifs and effects that underpin the changing relationship between the EU, its member states and its citizens. This 
The impact on domestic political and party systems
As already highlighted, we contend that the economic and Eurozone crises, and the EU response to them, are having important effects on the domestic political systems of EU member states. First, the economic crisis significantly affected the territorial and sectoral composition of public expenditure, with negative consequences for countries' long-term growth prospects (Grisorio and Prota 2015; Bubbico and Catalina-Rubianes 2015) . This impact has been particularly severe for the more vulnerable people and territories, as is testified by the exacerbation of social inequalities and regional disparities across the EU (European Commission 2014). It is reasonable to expect that these socially and territorially differentiated effects of the crisis would impact on voting behaviour.
Second, and related, the austerity packages and structural reforms have led to a re-centralisation of a substantial amount of policy competences in a number of countries (Bolgherini 2016; Muro 2015 (especially in connection with the economic crisis) that could not be detected at constituency level. The study shows: the presence of unsatisfied political demands (high abstention rates) and voters' volatility in both countries; considerable territorial variation, in both countries, in the electoral performance of the two new parties across municipalities; and that the economic crisis had a marked (positive) impact on the electoral affirmation of the two parties, which, however, is differentiated across the two countries.
Caiani and Graziano look at the rise of populism in the context of European Parliament elections. Going beyond the debate on theoretical definitions of populism, they find that focussing on empirical cases allows an appreciation that populism can manifest itself in multiple ways. The authors argue that, in order to be fully understood, populism should be considered not as a "syndrome to be cured" but as an observable phenomenon which may concern all political parties present in a given domestic political community. To substantiate this claim, the authors concentrate on the case of Italy, and they appraise the interaction between Italian political parties and (1999) . Despite focussing on the Italian case, Caiani and Graziano's work is also remarkable in that it does not simply offer a 'snapshot' of populism in Italy but also offers a method to appraise the degree of populism present in any given political system, adding to the study of such phenomena in other countries.
Conclusions
Through an examination of the 2014 (and, in some cases, preceding) European Parliament elections, the articles in this special issue provide new evidence on the linkage between the economic crisis and a number of EU-level political and institutional developments, including EU politicisation and Europeanisation of domestic frames. Whilst the crisis contributed to increasing the salience of the EU, at the same time it also delegitimised it. Responses to the economic crisis were perceived as not only technocratic but also as externally-imposed, bringing to the surface a long-simmering discontent amongst EU citizens that has found an outlet in Euroscepticism and anti-EU voting. The studies presented in this special issue also offer a novel interpretative frame for the 2014 elections. European Parliament elections have traditionally been viewed as second-order elections. This time, however, it was different, citizens did vote with EU issues in mind.
Importantly, the articles in this collection also shed light on the impact that European-level developments are having on the domestic political systems of EU member states, such as the emergence of new parties, the electoral strengthening of Eurosceptic parties, and a discernible increase in populist features across the entire political spectrum (i.e. also in non-populist parties). What is remarkable about the combination of populism and Euroscepticism that emerged as a key feature of the 2014 elections is that it is not simply retrospectively linked to the austerity measures that followed the economic crisis (whose effects are emphasised by several articles in this collection), but that it is also projected towards the future, questioning the role and sovereignty of the EU, and hinting at the need for the creation of new, and often ad hoc, relationships between the EU and its member states.
Whereas the dynamics of electoral behaviour favoured Eurosceptic and populist parties, they also triggered an 'emulation effect' among traditionally Europhile parties that are increasingly adopting critical narratives towards the EU.
Thus, despite the growing saliency of Europe in domestic public debates, the EU appears more and more as a jigsaw of diverging domestic interests and agendas. This is not to say that domestic interests never mattered before. Of course, they have always been part and parcel of the construct of Europe, and the EU has played a role in safeguarding them. However, in the current context, domestic interests are becoming increasingly polarised and conflicting. This is leading to the emergence of a number of competing visions of Europe, which challenge in a most profound way the idea of the EU as a coherent construct, generating constraints -rather than opportunities -for the integration process. Our overall conclusion is that EU-level and domestic-level developments both reflect and influence each other. Neither can be understood in isolation from the other. In our view, this calls for research designs that bridge different political science subfields, and for more vigorous crossfertilisation between European integration studies, comparative politics and political theory.
